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Abstract 
How does competition affect the investment banking business and the risks individual institutions 
are exposed to? Using a large sample of investment banks operating in seven developed economies 
over 1997-2014, we apply a panel VAR model to examine the relationships between competition and 
risk without assuming any a priori restrictions. Our main finding is that investment banks’ higher 
risk exposure, measured as a long-term capital-at-risk and return volatility, was facilitated by 
greater competitive pressures especially for full service investment banks but also for boutique 
investment banks. Overall, we find some evidence that more competition leads to more fragility 
before and during the recent financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Until the 2007 global financial crisis, the investment banking business enjoyed a prolonged 
period of prosperity and stability. Deregulation and technological improvements have contributed 
to the integration of investment and commercial banking and encouraged greater competitive 
pressures in the financial services sector (Goddard et al., 2007). As the industry became more 
contestable, firms were increasingly driven by profit maximizing motives. Many developed as 
large full-service institutions and responded to the decline in commissions gained from their 
traditional securities business by seeking new income sources. In particular, product and services 
diversification has led to greater (and possibly excessive) risk-taking activities and exposure, 
including proprietary trading and dealing with complex financial securities (Altunbas et al., 2009; 
Carbó-Valverde et al., 2011 and 2012). This increase in investment banks’ risk exposure could 
have contributed significantly to the greater fragility of the banking and financial sector. 
But how do investment banks compete? And how does competition affect the investment 
banking business and the risks these banks are exposed to? So far, we could not find any answer 
to these questions in the existing academic literature. Previous studies on this topic mainly focus 
on the commercial banking industry and largely overlook investment banks, although these latter 
played a critical role in generating and spreading the global financial crisis. Therefore, shedding 
lights on the mechanisms through which they can raise their risk-exposure is of great importance 
to policy-makers to identify prompt and efficient interventions to make the system less fragile. 
This paper covers this gap and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we 
empirically provide new insights on the relationship between competition and risk for a large 
sample of investments banks, covering a relatively long time span for both the pre- and post-
crisis period (1997-2014). Our first contribution is to construct a unique dataset of investment 
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banking institutions operating in seven developed economies (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Switzerland, UK and the US). Not only our dataset is larger than those analyzed in published studies 
on investment banks (e.g. Mamatzakis and Bermpei 2014; Radić et al., 2012; and Beccalli, 2004), but 
it also contains detailed information obtained from several sources: Bankscope, DataStream, the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the Heritage Foundation.  
Second, we measure competition in the investment banking business at the firm level using 
both the Efficiency-Adjusted Lerner Index of Monopoly Power (Koetter et al., 2012) and the 
Excess Price-Cost Margin (Gaspar and Massa, 2006). These measures have a number of 
advantages over traditional competition measures as they enable us to better account for 
investment banking features and for risk originated from profit maximisation. We also calculate 
several ad-hoc measures of investment banks’ risk-taking that proxy for two measures of 
volatility of an investment banks’ performance (i.e. rolling volatility for both ROA and total 
revenues), earnings-at-risk exposure and market risk.  
Thirdly, we distinguish between boutique investment banks (BIBs) and full service investment 
banks (FSIBs). The former specialize in particular segments of the market; they do not offer a 
broad range of services and are not part of larger financial institutions; while the latter offer 
clients a range of services including underwriting, merger and acquisition advisory services, 
trading, merchant banking and prime brokerage.
1
 Globalization, through cross border investment 
flows, and M&As, as well as direct and portfolio investment in emerging markets have fuelled 
the profitability particularly of FSIBs while, at the same time, exposing them to foreign market 
risks. Buch et al. (2013) note that international diversification may reduce but also increase the 
risk of an international financial firm depending on the correlation between domestic and foreign 
returns and on the volatility of foreign markets. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
                                                 
1
 For more details see e.g. Radić et al., (2012); Davis (2003); Gardener and Molyneux (1995). 
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relationship between competition and risk by considering the different exposures to international 
markets of investments banks. 
Finally, we formalize the relationship between risk exposure and market conditions in investment 
banking by implementing a panel-data vector auto-regression (VAR) methodology. This 
econometric approach fits very well our research aims since it allows us to test the impulse 
responses of risk exposure to changes in the market structure and competition levels, and vice 
versa, while considering bank- and industry-specific effects. We test for the short- and long-run 
effects of a change in risk exposure on the changes in competition and vice versa. As far as we 
are aware our study is the first to apply a panel VAR approach in assessing the bank competition-
risk taking relationship. We also perform several robustness and sensitivity checks to assess the 
reliability of our baseline results.  
Our evidence shows that higher competition (low market power) measured by the Efficiency-
Adjusted Lerner index of Monopoly Power or the Excess Price-Cost Margin is associated with 
higher risk exposure for both BIBs and FSIBs in terms of increase in earnings-at-risk or revenue 
volatility. We therefore find some support for the competition-fragility hypothesis in the 
investment banking industry both before and during the crisis. These results are consistent with 
several previous studies on commercial banks (e.g. Keeley, 1990, Allen and Gale, 2004; Repullo, 
2004; Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2015). However, we also find a positive relationship between 
market power and market risk. This result is not unusual in the literature since market measures 
change more frequently than accounting measures and better take into account market 
perceptions of the bank’s soundness in the future (Zigraiova and Havranek, 2016). Finally, 
compared to the existing research on commercial banks, we show that business models matter for 
risk-exposure. We find that smaller and more specialised boutique investment banks are less 
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likely to be affected by changes in competition, while bigger and full-service banks appear to 
increase their risk-exposure as competition increases as well. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature and 
sets out the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data sources and the empirical 
framework. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Over the 1990s the deregulation process that was carried out in the banking sectors of most 
developed countries was rooted in the idea that stimulating competition and increasing 
contestability in banking was the way forward to better quality of provision and sustainable 
growth (Molyneux et al., 1994). More competition in banking was expected to foster efficiency, 
stimulate innovation and boost international competitiveness. Various studies (e.g. Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004), in contrast, notably suggested that the view that competition is unambiguously 
good is more naïve in banking than in other industries.  
The empirical literature on the relationship between bank competition and risk, at least for 
commercial banks, is generally well established (for comprehensive reviews see Dick and 
Hannan, 2010; and Casu et al., 2012) and can broadly be related to the investment banking 
business. The theoretical approaches identify two views: the ‘competition-fragility’ (Keeley, 
1990, Allen and Gale, 2004; Repullo, 2004; Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2015) that argues that 
competition leads to more fragility and posits that in uncompetitive markets, banks earn 
monopoly rents resulting in higher profits, capital ratios and charter values. This makes them 
better placed to withstand demand- or supply-side shocks and discourages excessive risk-taking. 
Conversely, the ‘competition-stability’ view (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005; De Nicolò and 
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Lucchetta, 2009), argues against less competition claiming that the considerable market power of 
only a few banks will cause them to raise the interest rate on loans. This will adversely select the 
firms with risky projects and produce a negative impact on the stability of the banking system. 
Yet, there are theories suggesting that this relationship may not be so simple in that higher 
competition may transform the nature of banking and induce banks to become more or less 
relationship-oriented (Boot and Thakor, 2010). 
Despite the importance of the investment banking industry and the potential costs for society 
in case of insolvency as shown in the recent global crisis, there are only a handful of studies on 
the subject. The focus is typically on either the performance of investment banks (Radić, et al., 
2012; Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2014), or relationship-lending in investment banking (Anand 
and Galetovic, 2006; Boot and Thakor, 2000). While the former stream of literature deals with 
determinants of profitability in the industry based on their risk levels, the latter focuses on the 
link between relationship lending and competition. For example, Anand and Galetovic (2006) 
find evidence that investment banks establish relationships without either local or aggregate 
monopoly power, but do not assess the reasons behind this. The authors also poise that 
competition need not ‘kill’ relationships. Boot and Thakor (2000) predict that capital market 
competition reduces relationship lending and that this could ultimately affect the nature of the 
investment banking business.  
One of the main limitations of studies assessing the link between relationship lending and 
competition is that these dealings are considered in-direct (i.e., the sunk costs incurred by 
investment banks in establishing and maintaining each relationship are large and have already 
been incurred). Equally, due to better information processing, growth of securitization market, 
and availability of new rating tools and credit scoring information, a close bank-firm relationship 
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gets seemingly less important. Hence, banks will compete and earn higher margins mainly due to 
their risk exposure.
2
  
In this study, we expect that changes in competition will affect the investment banking 
industry and the risks these banks are exposed to. As far as we are aware, it is the first to explore 
the intertemporal relationship between investment banking sector competition and risk using 
panel VAR approach. Our results shed light on the competition-fragility puzzle (i.e. greater 
industry competition predicts an increase in banks’ risks) with specific reference to the 
investment banking industry. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
We analyze worldwide professional service firms: investment banks, securities houses, private 
banking and asset management companies. The data used in the empirical analysis is drawn from 
various sources: Bankscope, DataStream, the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, 
and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom database. We apply a number of 
selection criteria to arrive at our final sample. We consider unconsolidated data and we omit 
banks for which essential financial information is either not available (i.e., assets, equity, net 
income, specialization description) and/or is available for fewer than three consecutive years. We 
also exclude banks where that do not provide the financial information we need to estimate our 
measures of market power. Lastly, we exclude countries for which we have information on fewer 
than 50 bank-year observations.  
                                                 
2
 As such, the market power proxy, as a measure of competition, should capture incurred costs. 
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Our final sample comprises 116 investment banks operating in five European countries – 
namely France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, UK and Japan and the US over 1997-2014. Table 1 
reports some key financial indicators including mean profitability, asset size and sector 
concentration (HHITA). In the US, banks appear to be the largest and the most profitable, while 
German and Swiss banks are comparatively smaller and less profitable. In terms of asset 
composition, we observe that US institutions have the largest share of securities holding (about 
2/3 of their total assets) compared to the other countries; whereas Italian banks have the largest 
share of loans (45% of their total assets). The least concentrated markets are those in the US, the 
UK, and Switzerland, while the most concentrated are found in continental Europe (France, 
Germany and Italy). 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 1 >>> 
 
In order to investigate the specialization effect, we create a cluster sample by investment bank 
type. As in Radić et al. (2012), we distinguish between boutique investment banks (BIBs) and 
full service investment banks (FSIBs). The former are typically smaller in size and specialize in 
particular segments of the market in order to achieve greater profitability and survive competitive 
pressures from their larger peers in the industry, while full service investment banks strive to 
control their cost base in order to maximize their shares of revenue globally. To correctly identify 
these two groups of banks we collected information from three different sources so that to have a 
comprehensive and accurate profile of each bank.
3
   
                                                 
3
 Specifically, first we drew information on bank specialization and main business activity from Bankscope. Second, 
we obtained financial data by extracting additional specialization information and daily trading prices from 
Datastream. Third, we cross-checked previous steps with individual bank annual reports and Bloomberg 
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3.2. The empirical framework 
3.2.1. Measuring market conditions 
We use two proxies for measuring investment banking market conditions that capture 
competition at the bank level. The first is the Efficiency-Adjusted Lerner index of monopoly 
power (EALER) as proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). Unlike the conventional Lerner Index that 
has been frequently used to assess competition in the commercial banking sector (see for 
example, Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005; Turk-Ariss, 2010; Beck et al., 2013), this adjusted 
measure of market power enables us to better account for specific features of investment banking 
activities (i.e. non-lending activities). More specifically, while the conventional Lerner index 
includes the average risk premium charged by banks to their customers in the price calculation, 
the Efficiency-Adjusted Lerner index in addition to that accounts for risk originated from profit 
maximization objective of investment banks.
4
  
As in Koetter et al., (2012), the EALER is derived by estimating a translog cost function with 
three inputs, two outputs and a time trend as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡)
=  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
2
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑡 +   ∑(𝜑𝑖/2)
2
𝑗=1
(𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑖𝑡)
2 + ∑(𝜁𝑖/2)
3
𝑘=1
(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑡)
2
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑖𝑡
2
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝜉𝑡
2
𝜏=1
𝑇𝜏 + ∑ 𝜔𝑘𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑗𝑡
2
𝑗=1
 
                    (1) 
                                                                                                                                                              
Businessweek classification information. Finally, we dropped all cases of inconsistent or missing data and where 
banks were identified as trading or asset management companies only. 
4
 Koetter et al. (2012) demonstrates that the Lerner index is biased when profit inefficiencies are ignored, based on a 
study focusing on the US banking industry. 
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where TC denotes total cost, TP denotes profit before tax; Pkjt input factors to the production 
process of investment banks i= 1,2,..,n at time t, respectively P1, the price of labour, calculated as 
personnel expenses over total assets, P2, the price of physical capital, measured as other 
administrative expenses plus other operating expenses over total fixed assets; and P3, the price of 
other interest bearing liabilities and deposits short term funding; on the output side, we follow 
Radić et al. (2012) and consider investment banks’ business as follows: total earning assets (Y1), 
that is the sum of loans and other earning assets of bank i in year t, and investment banking fees 
(Y2), calculated as the sum of commission, fee and trading income of bank i in year t; and T is a 
time trend to capture technical change. We assume that εj = vj+uj, where random error vj is 
assumed to be i.i.d N(0, 2V) and independent of uj. The terms uj are non-negative random variables 
which are assumed to account for cost inefficiency and to be i.i.d. as truncations at zero of the N(0, U
2
). 
We specifically employ the time-varying stochastic frontier model for panel data for both the cost and 
profit functions.  
From equation (1), the marginal costs can be derived by taking the sum of the derivatives with 
respect to total earning assets (Y1it) and investment banking fees (Y2it) which yields: 
𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑌1𝑖𝑡
[𝛽1 +  𝜑1𝑙𝑛𝑌1𝑖𝑡 + (
𝜑
𝑖1
2
) 𝑙𝑛𝑌2𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆1𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑡
3
𝐾=1
+ 𝜔1𝑇]
+
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑌2𝑖𝑡
[𝛽2 +  𝜑2𝑙𝑛𝑌2𝑖𝑡 + (
𝜑
𝑖2
2
) 𝑙𝑛𝑌1𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆2𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑡
3
𝐾=1
+ 𝜔2𝑇] 
                   (2) 
The EALER is dependent on the “price” set by the bank and the marginal cost of producing 
one additional “unit”. While in commercial banking industry the price is proxied by total revenue 
over assets, and marginal costs is estimated for an additional unit of assets based on total 
personnel and other costs, this is less so in the case of the investment banking industry. 
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Investment banks can perform several advisory services without requiring a large asset basis; and 
there are also substantial economies of scale in the industry (e.g. market making activities in 
securities and derivatives markets, etc.) with some business lines that have large fixed costs. 
Potentially, only investment banks’ activities for which revenue over assets is an adequate price 
measure would seem to be the underwriting of private placements or syndicated loans. Therefore, 
in order to estimate the price p in the Lerner Index for the investment banking industry, we 
conjecture that forgone profits due to sub-optimal production levels are substantially larger 
compared to potential cost inefficiencies, so we also consider profit inefficiencies in the 
measurement of average revenues.
5
 
Using predicted total costs (PTC), corresponding marginal costs (MC), and predicted profits 
(PTP) relative to total output (TO = total earning assets + investment banking fees), an 
Efficiency-Adjusted Lerner index can be calculated as follows:  
𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑅 =
𝑃𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑂 +
𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑇𝑂 − 𝑀𝐶
𝑃𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑂 +
𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑇𝑂
=
𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶 − 𝑀𝐶𝑥𝑇𝑂
𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶
 
                  (3) 
EALER is thus derived from frontier estimates of PTP, PTC, and MC. Higher EALER (higher 
market power) is interpreted as lower competition. 
Our second proxy for market power at the bank level is Excess Price-Cost Margin (EPCM), 
defined as the difference between a bank’s operating profit margin (PCM) and the average 
operating profit margin of its industry. We follow Gaspar and Massa (2006) and their 
implementation of the price-cost margin (as equal to operating profits over revenues) and 
assumption, that average variable cost is a meaningful proxy for marginal cost. We then calculate 
                                                 
5
 This assumption is also in line with bank efficiency studies (for more info, please see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; 
Koetter et al., 2012). 
 13 
the logarithm value of this difference after having rescaled it by subtracting the minimum value at 
the bank level. Higher EPCM is associated with lower competition. Our second proxy, EPCM 
variable is better able to capture intra-industry differences in pricing power, that are due to the 
fact that different industries might have structurally different rates of profit for reasons unrelated 
to market power.
6
 
 
3.2.2. Measuring risk 
We measure investment banks’ risk-taking by using a detailed set of tailored measures that proxy 
for overall risk exposure: earnings-at-risk; a measure of rolling standard deviation of ROA over 3 
years; a measure of rolling standard deviation of logarithm of total revenues over 3 years; and market 
risk.  
Firstly, we further advance the existing literature (see for example Davis, 2003) by employing a 
measure of earnings-at-risk exposure. In particular, we measure the investment banks’ Capital-At-
Risk (CAR) using the alternative Earnings-at- Risk (EAR) estimation. Specifically, CAR can be 
defined as the amount of risk capital that a firm requires to cover the risks that it is running or 
collecting as a going concern. In order to do so we employ EAR that is a standard risk 
management technique (Andrén et al., 2005; Stein et al., 2001) which allows us to estimate the 
worst variation in earnings of the company, for a fixed time horizon and with a pre-established 
confidence level. Specifically, the EAR is obtained using a parametric model as follows: 
𝐸𝐴𝑅 = 𝜂 + 𝑧(1−𝛼)/2𝜎                 (4)
 
                                                 
6
 The criticisms made to the price-cost margin is that it does not take into account the cost of capital and that is 
usually valid only for companies that operate in a single line of business. In our sample the majority of banks are 
smaller and specialized, so adding another proxy for market power that is able to better capture these bank types 
seems justifiable (Gaspar and Massa, 2006). 
 14 
where η is the investment banks’ profit before tax (PBT); σ is the standard deviation of PBT over 
the sample period; and z(1-α)/2) is the probability associated with the α confidence level estimated 
assuming a normal distribution of earnings. In particular, if we assume that the earnings decline is 
permanent (long-term), consequently, the investment bank needs to hold an equity level equal to 
the present value of perpetuity of EAR as follows: 
roe
EAR
CAR  
             (5) 
where, roe is the mean bank Return On Equity estimated over the sample period. It is evident that 
higher measures of CAR correspond to higher risk for the banks.  
Secondly, we follow Beck et al. (2013) and make our next dependent variable directly 
proportional to banking stability. In particular, we calculate the rolling volatility for both ROA 
and total revenues over a period of three years. This is a measure of the volatility of an 
investment bank’s performance. A higher volatility can exert a negative effect on a bank’s 
viability and growth opportunities.  
Finally, we use a market risk measure (MR), which captures the standard deviation of stock 
returns at the bank level. This risk proxy only accounts for listed banks and takes in account the 
idiosyncratic volatility of the stock of investment banks as suggested by Deng and Elysiani (2008). To 
recap, an increase in CAR, σlnTR, σROA and MR means more risk-exposure for an investment bank.  
The correlation coefficients between the risk measures are usually positive and significant at 
one percent, while the correlation between EALER and EPCM is also positive, albeit 
insignificant. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 2 >>> 
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3.2.3. The relationships between risk and competition: a panel VAR approach 
To formalize the relationship between risk exposure and market conditions in investment banking 
industry, we rely on panel-data vector autoregression methodology (PVAR). This econometric 
approach fits very well our research aims since it allows us to test the impulse responses of risk 
exposure to changes in competition levels, and vice versa, while taking into account bank and 
country-specific effects. This methodology enables us to avoid imposing a priori assumptions 
about the relationship between risk and competition variables in the model. As such, we follow 
Love and Zicchino (2006), and Abrigo and Love (2016) and specify our model as follows
7
: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1𝐴1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝐵 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡               (6) 
 
where, Y(t) is a two-variable vector of endogenous variables that consist of risk and competition, 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a (1𝑥𝑙) vector of exogenous covariates; 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are (1𝑥𝑘) vectors of dependent variable-
specific panel fixed-effects and idiosyncratic errors. Therefore, risk and competition variables 
enter the model as endogenous variables. In this way we are able to deal with endogeneity 
concerns due to reverse causality. Previous recent papers (e.g. Beck et al., 2013) employed IV 
(2SLS) estimator and two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to address 
endogeneity issue, or Granger causality to examine competition-stability nexus (e.g. Fiordelisi 
and Mare, 2014). In our study, we not only take into account endogeneity issues, but we also 
explore the short and long-run effects of a change in risk (competition) for the effect of a change 
in competition (risk). 
                                                 
7
 For recent applications of Love and Zicchino (2006)’s model to the banking sector see e.g. Delis et al., (2014), 
Head et al., (2014); Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). 
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As suggested by Love and Zicchino (2006), the original variables are time-demeaned and the 
fixed individual effects are removed by the Helmert transformation method. To set the number of 
lags we employ the Andrews and Lu (2001)’s procedure for GMM models based on Hansen’s 
(1982) 𝐽 statistic of over-identifying restrictions. The test suggests 1 lag (q=1) is optimal. To 
control for bank-specific effects we use mean differencing – the so-called Helmert’s 
transformation – which allows for transformed variables and orthogonal lagged regressors. In this 
way, we can use lagged regressors as instruments and use GMM to estimate the PVAR. We 
employ 1000 Monte Carlo simulations to get bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals for the impulse 
response functions. We also subtract from each variable in the model its cross-sectional mean 
before estimation to remove time fixed effects. This should help mitigate endogeneity concerns 
generated by omitted variables. 
Finally, we compute forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVD) based on a Cholesky 
decomposition of the residual covariance matrix of the underlying panel VAR model and again 
using 1000 Monte Carlo simulation. In accordance with Abrigo and Love (2016) we drop the 
exogenous variables when calculating the FEDV. This decomposition allows us to observe the 
magnitude of the total effect because it shows the percentage of variation in one variable 
explained by the ‘shock’ (i.e. a change) to another variable over time. 
Equation (6) shows that we incorporate in the model a Xit set of variables that describe different 
bank-specific and macro factors that we believe should be controlled for when investigating the 
relationships between risk and competition in the investment banking industry. As discussed above, 
we control for bank type by splitting the sample into boutique and full investment banks. We also 
recognize the possibility that regulation, supervision and other related factors that restrict banks’ 
activities may have a significant impact on competition and market structure. Therefore, we 
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include an Index of Economic Freedom that provides us with a portrait of a country’s economic 
policies over time (ECF). We also control for business cycle effects by adding the annual real 
GDP growth (ΔGDP) to the model. This macroeconomic variable is commonly used in the 
banking literature (e.g. Salas and Saurina, 2003; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Brissimis et al., 
2008) and is expected to influence the relationship among risk-capital-efficiency-competition. A 
summary of the variables used for the empirical investigation is provided in Table 3, including 
the descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest for the aggregate sample over the 
observed time period. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 3 >>> 
 
4. Discussion of results 
4.1. Analysis of PVAR 
We run a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model to explore the effect of the risk exposure 
shocks on bank competition and vice versa. We first estimate the coefficients of the PVAR 
system given in equation (6) after country-time and bank-specific fixed effects have been 
removed. Table 4 and Table 5 report the results of the main model with the Efficiency-Adjusted 
Lerner Index (EALER) and the model with Excess Price-Cost Margin (EPCM), respectively. 
Results include the full sample of banks in each country. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 4 >>> 
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Table 4 shows that EALER at time t-1 predicts CAR, σlnTR and σROA (columns 1 and 3). We 
find evidence that competition exhibits a negative impact on CAR and σlnTR.8 These findings 
suggest that higher competition (lower market power) can increase investment banks’ risk 
exposure in terms of earnings-at-risk or revenue volatility. The estimated coefficient for σROA is 
positive and statistically significant at five percent confidence level. Interestingly, EALER 
impacts positively on σROA only in the short-term; it then exhibits a reverse trend as further 
tested in Section 4.2. In contrast, competition is statistically insignificant when we use market 
risk as dependent variable.  
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 5 >>> 
 
Results reported in Table 5 show that the response in risk exposure to increase in EPCM is 
significant and negative in the case of CAR and σlnTR. Additionally, an increase in EPCM 
appears to be positively and significantly related to MR. This result is not unusual in the literature 
since market measures change more frequently than accounting measures and better take into 
account market perceptions of a bank’s soundness in the future (Zigraiova and Havranek, 2016). 
As in the case of EALER we find that an increase in competition is followed by increase in 
earnings-at-risk and revenue volatility. Consistently with the arguments of Hellman et al., (2000) 
and Allen and Gale (2004), our results for CAR and σlnTR imply that banks in competitive 
markets (and lower market power) increase their risk profile.  
Focusing on the institutional environment in Table 4, a higher ECF appears to be associated 
with an increase in risk exposure and competition only for σROA (at the 1 per cent confidence 
                                                 
8
 The Hansen’s (1982) test always rejects the hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions and therefore confirms the 
validity of our instruments. 
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level). In the case of EPCM model (Table 5) we find no such effect. GDP growth does not appear 
strongly linked to investment banks’ risk (with the exception of CAR), however we find that 
GDP growth at time t-1 is negatively and significantly related to both EALER and EPCM.  
 
4.2. Impulse responses  
We also examine the orthogonalized impulse-responses of the banks’ risk measures to 
competition shock. Figure 1 reports the effect on a change (Δ) in risk measures of shock to 
EALER, while Figure 2 focuses on the effect on Δ in risk measures of shock to EPCM. The 
responses of the variables are depicted by the solid lines, while the grey area refers to the 95% 
confidence interval. The simulation horizon covers three periods. Before running the impulse-
responses function we verify that PVAR satisfies the stability conditions.  
 
<<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >>> 
 
After running the full sample analysis, we notice that for some risk measures, the confidence 
interval for the impulse-response function is large.
9
 This suggests that after transforming the data 
there is still heterogeneity in the response function to a shock of either EALER or EPCM. So, we 
identify the business model of investment banks as a possible source of heterogeneity in our 
sample. As discussed in Section 3.1, boutique and full service investment banks differ because of 
their business specialization. Boutique banks mainly deal with specific lines of activities and 
geographical regions, while full service investment banks are more diversified both in terms of 
products and services offered and covered geographical area. As boutique investment banks 
                                                 
9
 These results are available upon the request from the authors. 
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operate in niche markets, they tend to be less exposed to a shock in competition, but they tend to 
be more vulnerable to macro-economic or demand shocks as they are less diversified. Therefore, 
we could expect full service investment banks to react differently to a shock in competition 
compared to boutique banks. Consequently, we run the PVAR analysis by splitting the sample for 
boutique banks and full-service investment banks only. Specifically, Figure 1 reports the 
orthogonalized impulse-response function for risk measures to shock to EALER for both groups 
of banks. 
Figure 1 illustrates significant and negative impulse response functions of CAR and σlnTR 
(FSIBs and BIBs) and MR (FSIBs) for the effect of a shock to EALER. Instead, the impulse 
response function of σROA (BIBs) is positively and significantly related to a shock to EALER 
only in 1-year horizon. In contrast, the impulse response functions σROA (FSIBs) and MR 
(BIBs) to a shock to EALER are never significantly different from zero.  
Figure 2 displays the impulse-response functions for risk measures to shock to EPCM for both 
boutique and full-service investment banks. 
 
<<< INSERT FIGURE 2 >>> 
 
By focusing only on changes to risk measures for the effect of EPCM, we notice that boutique 
and full service investment banks react almost in the same way to a shock to EPCM. Especially 
in the case of CAR, both boutique and full-service investment banks are negatively and 
significantly related to a shock to EPCM. In fact, the reaction is almost identical. Equally, the 
impact on σlnTR (FSIBs) is also significant and negative. σlnTR (BIBs) and MR appear to not 
react significantly to a shock to EPCM, as the effect of shock to EPCM seems to wear off 
relatively quickly. Boutique investment banks tend to exhibit a reverse trend after 1-year horizon. 
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σROA follows similar pattern but the positive magnitude of the shock in the case of boutique 
investment banks is even greater, then again wears off in period 3. Overall, for the above 
variables we seem to find evidence of only a significant short effect. 
Differently from EALER in Figure 2, we find that the confidence intervals are smaller. This 
indicates that there may be less heterogeneity left in the response functions between risk 
measures and EPCM.  
Overall, by splitting the sample based on banks’ specialization we observe some interesting 
patterns. Smaller and more specialised boutique investment banks are less negatively affected by 
changes in competition than bigger and full-service banks. This is plausible since the former are 
likely to be affected by higher volatility of earnings in the short-run while it is plausible to 
contend that full service banks, due to their more diversified income streams, are more likely to 
get affected in the long run if there are changes to their viability and growth opportunities. 
 
4.3. Risk and competition before the outbreak of the global financial crisis  
The global financial crisis and the more recent eurozone sovereign debt crisis, have had a 
profound impact on the stability of the financial system, its ability to smooth flow of funds and 
help promote growth in economic activity. It is well known that several large banking institutions 
failed and exited the market (e.g. Lehman Brothers), while others were either taken over or 
nationalised (i.e. Merrill Lynch, Royal Bank of Scotland). Public authorities have adopted wide-
ranging interventions (i.e. recapitalization, debt guarantees, asset purchases) to help reduce the 
fragility of the banking system and restore confidence in the markets. However, it is reasonable to 
expect that the crisis could have altered both the overall risk exposure and the competitive 
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dynamics in the banking sector (e.g. Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Calderon and Schaeck, 2015). 
Given the above, we rerun our analysis by solely focusing on the years before the financial crisis.  
Table 6 reports the main results. It appears that even in the period prior to the crisis, EALER 
affects negatively CAR and positively σROA. Similarly to our main results, we also find 
evidence of reverse causality for CAR. When significant, ECF and GDP at time t-1 are still 
negatively related to EALER. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 6 >>> 
 
Finally, Table 7 shows that EPCM is again negatively related to CAR and to σlnTR. However, 
EPCM does not appear to enhance market risk volatility of investments banks anymore.  Overall, 
and apart from σROA, our result support our main conclusion from Section 4.1 where we find 
that more competition leads to more fragility for the investment banking sector, both in crisis and 
non-crisis years. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 7 >>> 
 
4.4. Variance decomposition 
Table 8 reports the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) at the 1- to 3-year forecast 
horizon. In particular, part 8a illustrates the FEVD for EALER or EPCM (the risk measures are 
the impulse variables) while part 8b shows the FEVD of each risk measure (EALER and EPCM 
are the impulse variables). We compute FEVD based on the Cholesky decomposition of the 
residual covariance matrix for each specification of our Panel VAR model. We also run 1000 
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Monte Carlo draws to estimate the standard errors and confidence intervals. We finally exclude 
the exogenous variables from the baseline PVAR model to get reliable FEVD (Abrigo and Love, 
2005). Differently from the impulse-response function, the FEVD allows us to get more insights 
on the magnitude of each shocks exerted by a change on the competition measures. This is 
important to grasp the economic meaning of changes in risk measures because of shock to 
competition measures. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 8 >>> 
 
Table 8 (part 8a) illustrates that shock to CAR accounts for large variations in EALER with an 
average effect of 13% over the forecast horizon. Further, with a variation of about 5% and 2%, 
the contribution of respectively σlnTR and σROA shock to fluctuations of EALER is also 
sizeable. We find similar figures in the case of EPCM. More specifically, σlnTR, σROA and this 
time also MR provide the largest contribution in EPCM’s variation. In particular, these risk 
measures account even up to 34% in the case of σROA, 12% in the case of σlnTR and 10% in the 
case of MR. These findings are in line with our results from Tables 4-7.  
Focusing on Table 8 (part 8b) we observe that a shock to EALER only covers a minor part of 
fluctuations in risk measures. It only explains a variation of 1-4% of risk measures starting from 
year 2 (namely for CAR and σROA). Similarly, a shock to EPCM seems to explain a small 
portion of the variation of only σROA (one per cent). These findings suggest that a shock to 
competition does not have a direct impact on contemporaneous risk measures. 
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4.5. Robustness Check 
The main results reported in Table 4 are robust to several sensitivity checks. First, we re-run 
the cost and profit functions by using the Fourier Flexible functional form. Following Bolt and 
Humphrey (2015) we add the sin and cos terms to add flexibility to the U-shaped translog specified in 
equation (1). The results derived from the Fourier specification are reported in Table 9 and they are 
broadly consistent with those in Table 4, as EALER impacts negatively and significantly CAR 
and σlnTR, while it has a positive and significant impact on σROA. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 9 >>> 
 
Second, we employ as robustness check the Boone indicator (Boone, 2008), that is a relatively 
new measure of competition that is essentially a profit elasticity and focuses the strength of the 
relationship between efficiency (measured in terms of marginal costs) and performance 
(profitability). Following e.g. Liu et al., (2013) and Schaeck and Cihak (2014), we calculate the 
elasticity of profits (π) to marginal costs by country and year as shown in equation (7). 
𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽l𝑛𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                (7) 
where the marginal cost (mc) is calculated using a translog cost function (see Equation 2). The 
Boone is negative because profits and marginal cost exhibit a negative relationship; a larger 
Boone indicator in absolute value indicates a more competitive banking industry.  
Results are reported in Table 10 and are consistent with the results reported in Table 4 in only 
two cases (CAR and σROA). Although the Boone indicator has many appealing qualities it often 
underperforms in comparative tests of banking market conditions hence results should be treated 
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with some caution (Liu et al., 2013; Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010). One possible reason 
is that the Boone makes critical assumptions relative to firm size and to market definition. In 
addition, it does not offer a measure of market power at the bank-year level (for more details see 
e.g. Delis et al., 2016). 
<<< INSERT TABLE 10 >>> 
 
Finally, following Delis et al., (2016), we test for potential non-linear effects between 
competition, EALER, and risk. We did not find any evidence of such a linear effect.
10
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Competition is usually regarded an indispensable force in the economy because it triggers 
greater efficiency, innovation, enhanced consumers’ choices and generally promotes a better 
allocation of resources. In banking, though, the issue of benefits derived from competition has 
always been controversial as these should be weighed against the danger of financial instability. 
Post crisis many viewed competition as a factor leading to higher bank risk-taking.  
In this paper, we empirically formalize the relationship between risk exposure and market 
conditions in the investment banking industry. We employ a panel VAR approach that allows us to 
capture the impulse responses of risk exposure to changes in competition levels, and vice versa. 
We use a large dataset of banks from the seven most developed investment banking industries 
(France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the US) over 1997-2014 and test 
alternative measures of market power (as lack of competition) and risk.  
                                                 
10
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these tests. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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We show that investment banks’ response in risk exposure to a competition change is 
significant and negative as evidenced in the estimated coefficients and impulse responses. We 
also find that excess price-cost margin raises uncertainty about the banks’ market returns. 
Further, when we check for impulse responses and cluster our sample by business models we find 
that both boutique investment banks and full-service investment banks exhibit significant changes 
to earnings-at-risk and revenue volatility due to shock to competition (for both EALER and 
EPCM), whereas other risk proxies either exhibit no change or the change wears off quickly.  
Our results provide some evidence to support the ‘competition-fragility view’ which argues 
that competition induces excessive risk-taking and therefore is detrimental for stability because it 
could result in a higher likelihood of individual banks’ failures. These can be very costly for 
society as witnessed by the events that followed the outbreak of the global financial crisis a 
decade ago. Our findings appear to hold both prior to the crisis and for the whole period under 
study, and by investment banks’ specialization,BIBs vs FIBS, with a stronger effect for the latter 
ones. These findings raise at least two implications for policy-makers. On the one hand, the need 
to better balance policy prescriptions so that to allow a healthy degree of rivalry necessary for 
ensuring dynamic efficiency of the industry. On the other hand, the findings of this study provide 
support that a certain level of market power maybe necessary in the investment banking industry 
to give institutions less incentives to undertake risky business.  
  
 27 
References 
Abrigo, M.R.M., Love, I., (2016). Estimation of Panel Vector Autoregression in Stata: a Package 
of Programs. http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_16-02.pdf 
Anand, B., Galetovic, A., (2006). Relationships, competition and the structure of investment 
banking markets. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 54, Issue 2, 151-199.  
Allen, F., Gale, D., (2004). Competition and Financial Stability. Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, Vol. 36, No. 3, 453-480. 
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., Marques-Ibanez, D., (2009). Securitization and the bank lending 
channel. European Economic Review, 53, 996-1009. 
Andrén, N., Jankensgard, H., Oxelheim, L., (2005). Exposure‐based cash‐flow‐at‐ risk: An 
alternative to value‐at‐risk for industrial companies. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
17(3): 76-87. 
Andrews, D.W.K., Lu, B., (2001). Consistent model and moment selection procedures for GMM 
estimation with application to dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 101(1), 123-
164. 
Beccalli, E., (2004). Cross-Country Comparisons of Efficiency: Evidence from the UK and Italian 
Investment Firms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 1363-1383. 
Beck, T., De Jonghe, O., Schepens, G., (2013). Bank competition and stability: cross-country 
heterogeneity. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22, 218-244. 
Berger, A. N., Bouwman, C.H.S., (2013). How does capital affect bank performance during 
financial crises? Journal of Financial Economics, 109(1), 146-176. 
Berger, A.N., Humphrey, D.B., (1997). Efficiency of Financial Institutions: International Survey 
and Directions for Future Research. European Journal of Operational Research, 98, 175-212. 
Boot, A., Thakor, A., (2000). Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition? The Journal of 
Finance, 55 (2), 679-713. 
Boyd, J.H., De Nicolò, G., (2005). The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited. 
The Journal of Finance, 60 (3), 1329-1343. 
Brissimis, S.N., Delis, M.D., Papanikolaou, N.I., (2008). Exploring the Nexus between Banking 
Sector Reform and Performance: Evidence from Newly Acceded EU Countries. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 32, 2674-2683. 
Boone, J., (2008). A New Way to Measure Competition. Economic Journal, 118, 1245-1261. 
Bolt, W., Humphrey, D., (2015). A frontier measure of U.S. banking competition. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 246, 450-461. 
Boone, J., (2008). A New Way to Measure Competition. Economic Journal, 118, 1245-1261. 
Buch, C., Koch, C., Koetter, M., (2013). Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting 
the Market Power-Risk Nexus. Review of Finance, Vol. 17(4), 1401-1435. 
Calderon, C., Schaeck, K., (2015). The effects of government interventions in the financial sector 
on banking competition and the evolution of zombie banks. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis (Forthcoming). 
 28 
Carbó-Valverde, S., Hannan, H.T., Rodriguez-Fernandez, F., (2011). Exploiting old customers 
and attracting new ones: The case of bank deposit pricing. European Economic Review, 55, 903-
915. 
Carbó-Valverde, S., Marques-Ibanez, D., Rodríguez-Fernández, F., (2012). Securitization, risk-
transferring and financial instability: The case of Spain. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 31, 80-101. 
Casu, B., Girardone, C., Molyneux, P., (2012). Is There a Conflict Between Competition and 
Financial Stability? In: Barth, J.R., Lin, C., Wihlborg, C., (Eds.), Research Handbook on 
International Banking and Governance, part 1. Edward Elgar Publishing (Forthcoming). 
Claessens, S., Laeven, L., (2004). What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence. 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 36, No. 3, 563-584. 
Davis, S.I., (2003). Investment banking: Addressing the management issues. Palgrave 
MacMillan 
Delis, M., Hasan, I., Kazakis, P. (2014). Bank regulations and income inequality: Empirical 
evidence. Review of Finance, 18: 1811-1846. 
Delis, M., Kokas, S., Ongena, S., (2016). Foreign bank ownership and competition: Evidence 
from a world sample. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48, 449-483. 
De Nicolò, G., Lucchetta, M., (2009). Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk: A 
General Equilibrium Exposition. International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 09/105. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09105.pdf 
Deng, S.E., Elyasiani, E., (2008). Geographic diversification, bank holding company value, and 
risk. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 40, No. 6, 1217- 1238. 
Dick, A.A., Hannan, T.H., (2010). Competition and Antitrust Policy in Banking. In: Berger, 
A.N., Molyneux, P., Wilson, J.O.S., (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Banking. Oxford University 
Press, pp. 405-429. 
Fernandez de Guevara, J., Maudos, J., Perez, F., (2005). Market Power in European Banking 
Sector. Journal of Financial Services Research, 27:2, 109-137. 
Fiordelisi F., Mare, D. S., (2014). Competition and financial stability in European cooperative 
banks. Journal of International Money and Finance, 45, 1–16. 
Forssbæck, J., Shehzad, C.T., (2015). The Conditional Effects of Market Power on Bank Risk 
Cross - Country Evidence. Review of Finance, 10(5): 1997-2038. 
Gaspar, J.M., Massa, M., (2006). Idiosyncratic Volatility and Product Market Competition. The 
Journal of Business, Vol. 79, No. 6, 3125-3152. 
Gardener, E., Molyneux, P., (1995). Investment banking: theory and practice. Euromoney Books, 
London. 
Goddard, J., Molyneux, P., Wilson, J.O.S., Tavakoli, M., (2007). European banking: An 
overview. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 1911-1935. 
Hansen, L.P., (1982). Large sample properties of Generalized Method of Moments estimators. 
Econometrica, 50, 1029-1054. 
Head, A., Lloyd-Ellis, H., Sun, S., (2014). Search, Liquidity, and the Dynamics of House Prices 
and Construction. American Economic Review, 104(4): 1172-1210. 
 29 
Hellman, T., Mudock, K., Stiglitz, J.E., (2000). Liberalization, moral hazard in banking and 
prudential regulation: Are capital controls enough? American Economic Review 90 (1): 147–165. 
Imbierowicz, B., Rauch, C., (2014). The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in 
banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 40, 242-256. 
Keeley, M.C., (1990). Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. The American 
Economic Review, 1183-1200. 
Koetter, M., Kolari, J.W., Spierdijk, L., (2012). Enjoying the quiet life under deregulation? 
Evidence from adjusted Lerner indices for US banks. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, 
462-480. 
Liu, H., Molyneux, P., Wilson J.O.S., (2013). “Competition in banking: measurement and 
interpretation”, Chapter 8 In: Bell, A.R., Brooks, C., Prokopczuk, M., (eds.) Handbook of 
Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Finance. Edward Elgar, pp. 197-215. 
Love, I., Zicchino, L., (2006). Financial development and dynamic investment behavior: 
Evidence from panel VAR. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46(2), 190-210. 
Mamatzakis, E., Bermpei, T., (2014). What drives investment bank performance? The role of risk, 
liquidity and fees prior to and during the crisis. International Review of Financial Analysis, 35, 
102-117. 
Molyneux, P., Lloyd-Williams, D.M., Thornton, J., (1994). Competitive conditions in European 
banking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 18, 445-459. 
Pástor, L., Veronesi, P., (2003). Stock Valuation and Learning about Profitability. The Journal of 
Finance, Volume 58, Issue 5, 1749-1789. 
Radić, N., Fiordelisi, F., Girardone, C., (2012). Efficiency and Risk-taking in pre-crisis 
Investment Banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 41:81-101. 
Repullo, R. (2004) Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 13, 156–182. 
Salas, V., Saurina, J., (2003). Deregulation, Market Power and Risk Behaviour in Spanish Banks. 
European Economic Review, 47, 1061-1075. 
Schaeck, K., Cihak, M. (2014). Competition, efficiency, and stability in banking. Financial 
Management, 43, 215–241. 
Schiersch, A., Schmidt-Ehmcke, L., (2010). Empiricism Meets Theory: Is the Boone-Indicator 
Applicable?” DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper 1030.  
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.358332.de/dp1030.pdf 
Stein, J.C., Usher, S.E., LaGattuta, D., Youngen, J., (2001). A comparables approach to 
measuring cashflow‐at‐risk for non‐financial firms. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 13(4): 
100-109. 
Turk-Ariss, R., (2010). On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from 
developing countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 765-775. 
Yildirim, H.S., Philippatos, G.C., (2007). Restructuring, Consolidation and Competition in Latin 
American Banking Markets. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 629-639. 
Zigraiova, D., Havranek, T., (2016). Bank competition and financial stability: much ado about 
nothing? Journal of Economic Surveys, 30(5), 944-981. 
 
  
 30 
 
 
Table 1. Key indicators of the investment banking sectors 1997-2014 (mean values) 
Country Pre-TaxProfit* Assets* Loans* Securities* IB Fees* Equity* ROA ROE HHITA 
France 65,009 18,832,577 1,457,758 7,296,549 147,098 422,122 1.74% 13.71% 0.396 
Germany 7,384 4,989,801 1,320,666 2,212,820 71,574 200,237 1.18% 7.11% 0.272 
Italy 102,566 19,423,644 6,372,307 8,639,485 80,349 1,066,545 1.03% 4.87% 0.394 
Japan 182,206 35,239,665 9,722,419 23,207,237 444,212 1,846,815 0.91% 5.38% 0.237 
Switzerland 38,618 4,718,450 1,321,297 937,000 101,394 387,271 1.58% 8.17% 0.190 
UK 92,632 55,732,372 8,596,902 41,049,017 187,072 1,599,268 1.02% 5.50% 0.186 
US 684,678 103,528,516 8,994,366 73,030,457 1,915,743 4,928,760 0.51% 6.35% 0.223 
Note: * Data is in USD thousand. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
CAR σlnTR σROA MR EALER EPCM ECF GDP 
CAR 1 
       σlnTR 0.1982* 1 
      σROA 0.0006 0.2648* 1 
     MR 0.2661* 0.3626* 0.1561* 1 
    EALER 0.4915* 0.1298* -0.0364 0.1517* 1 
   EPCM -0.1150* -0.3370* -0.2955* 0.0401 0.0174 1 
  ECF 0.0633* 0.0234 0.0005 0.0639 -0.0754* -0.0018 1 
 GDP -0.1273* -0.0272 -0.0384 -0.0683 -0.0045 0.0149 0.0974* 1 
Note: Significance at * p<0.01. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.
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Table 3. Summary of variable definitions and sources 
Table 2 defines the variables used in the paper and provides simple summary statistics. (1) The source of data used to estimate variables is Fitch IBCA’s BankScope 
Database. (2) Data on the stock prices and indices were collected from DataStream database. (3) Data were collected from the Economic Freedom Index of the 
Heritage Foundation. (4) Data were collected from World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
 Variable name Mean St. Dev. Description 
Risk measures 
(1,2)
 Capital-at-risk 3.648 1.857 CAR is a measure of investment banks’ capital at risk. 
 Total revenues volatility 0.225 0.229 
σlnTR is a measure of rolling standard deviation of total revenues 
over 3 years. 
 Return on assets volatility 0.015 0.035 
σlnROA is a measure of rolling standard deviation of ROA over 3 
years. 
 Market risk  0.024 0.020 MR is calculated as the standard deviation of stock returns. 
Bank market structure and 
competition 
(1)
 
Efficiency-Adjusted Lerner index 0.406 1.198 
EALER is an indicator of the degree of market power derived 
from a translog cost (and profit) function. 
 Excess price-cost margin -0.059 1.338 
EPCM is another proxy for market power, defined as the 
difference between a bank’s operating profit margin and the 
average operating profit margin of its industry. 
Control variables 
(1)
 Bank type/specialization   
BT is a dummy variable, where the bank is full service or 
specialised, where 1 = FSIB; 0 = BIB. 
Institutional environment 
(3)
 Economic freedom 4.289 0.092 
ECF is an indicator of economic freedom (ranging from 0 to 
100). Greater values signify more freedom. It is in logarithm 
form. 
Macroeconomic variables 
(4)
 GDP growth 0.9682 2.041 GDP represents the growth in GDP (annual %). 
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Table 4. Main results of the panel VAR model focusing on EALER (1997-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Risk is alternatively CAR (for column 1), σlnTR (for column 2), σROA (for column 3) and MR (for 
column 4). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 2.  
  
Variables 
 
1) 
CAR 
2) 
σlnTR 
3) 
σROA 
4) 
MR 
RISK (t-1) 0.421*** 0.138 0.549*** 0.393*** 
 
(0.095) (0.218) (0.164) (0.102) 
EALER (t-1) -0.307* -0.070* 0.003** 0.000 
 
(0.164) (0.040) (0.001) (0.005) 
ECF(t) 0.098 0.719 0.221*** 0.129 
 
(2.771) (0.753) (0.076) (0.110) 
GDP(t) -0.331*** 0.020 0.002 0.002 
 (0.096) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
    
 EALER EALER EALER EALER 
RISK (t-1) 0.005 -0.025 0.491 -3.808 
 
(0.036) (0.300) (1.051) (3.153) 
EALER (t-1) 0.952*** 0.773*** 0.859*** 0.839*** 
 
(0.122) (0.112) (0.118) (0.314) 
ECF(t) -1.181 -2.098** -2.215* 4.059 
 
(0.977) (0.970) (1.182) (5.217) 
GDP(t) -0.147*** -0.077*** -0.120*** -0.039 
 
(0.038) (0.026) (0.031) (0.058) 
 
    
Hansen's J p-value 0.271 0.669 0.756 0.322 
Obs 1514 1341 1346 340 
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Table 5. Main results of the panel VAR model focusing on EPCM (1997-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Risk is alternatively CAR (for column 1), σlnTR (for column 2), σROA (for column 3) and MR (for 
column 4). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 2. 
  
Variables 
 
1) 
CAR 
2) 
σlnTR 
3) 
σROA 
4) 
MR 
RISK (t-1) 0.421*** 0.180*** 0.163 0.496*** 
 
(0.095) (0.059) (0.223) (0.156) 
EPCM (t-1) -0.307* -0.073** 0.005 0.004** 
 
(0.164) (0.032) (0.006) (0.002) 
ECF(t) 0.098 0.509 0.406*** -0.048 
 
(2.771) (0.681) (0.120) (0.075) 
GDP(t) -0.331*** 0.007 0.005** 0.001 
 (0.096) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
    
 EPCM EPCM EPCM EPCM 
RISK (t-1) -0.028 0.032 -4.031 -1.409 
 
(0.021) (0.082) (3.223) (3.010) 
EPCM (t-1) 0.281*** 0.244*** 0.153 -0.021 
 
(0.072) (0.065) (0.108) (0.038) 
ECF(t) -0.281 -5.946*** -9.030*** -1.095 
 
(0.730) (1.549) (2.710) (1.447) 
GDP(t) -0.010 -0.136*** -0.120*** -0.016 
 
(0.024) (0.035) (0.044) (0.030) 
 
    
Hansen's J p-value 0.164 0.570 0.219 0.518 
Obs 1591 1341 1346 340 
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Table 6. Main results of the panel VAR model focusing on EALER (1997-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Risk is alternatively CAR (for column 1), σlnTR (for column 2), σROA (for column 3) and MR (for 
column 4). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 2. 
  
Variables 
 
1) 
CAR 
2) 
σlnTR 
3) 
σROA 
4) 
MR 
RISK (t-1) 0.874*** 0.573*** 0.515*** 0.698*** 
 
(0.130) (0.139) (0.159) (0.155) 
EALER (t-1) -0.474* 0.011 0.006** -0.022 
 
(0.245) (0.068) (0.003) (0.014) 
ECF(t) 2.086 0.469 0.092** -0.139 
 
(1.596) (0.451) (0.041) (0.112) 
GDP(t) -0.306*** 0.008 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.067) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
    
 EALER EALER EALER EALER 
RISK (t-1) 0.149** -0.081 -0.011 7.444 
 
(0.062) (0.111) (2.763) (4.595) 
EALER (t-1) 0.959*** 0.868*** 0.821*** 1.258 
 
(0.133) (0.181) (0.194) (0.838) 
ECF(t) 0.229 -1.218* -2.324*** 1.431 
 
(0.795) (0.661) (0.800) (6.599) 
GDP(t) -0.047* -0.007 0.010 0.043 
 
(0.028) (0.015) (0.020) (0.107) 
 
    
Hansen's J p-value 0.122 0.780 0.720 0.865 
Obs 665 530 534 158 
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Table 7. Main results of the panel VAR model focusing on EPCM (1997-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Risk is alternatively CAR (for column 1), σlnTR (for column 2), σROA (for column 3) and MR (for 
column 4). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 2. 
 
Variables 
 
1) 
CAR 
2) 
σlnTR 
3) 
σROA 
4) 
MR 
RISK (t-1) 0.986*** 0.596*** 0.462*** 0.748*** 
 
(0.200) (0.086) (0.162) (0.158) 
EPCM (t-1) -0.476* -0.054* 0.003 0.000 
 
(0.259) (0.031) (0.008) (0.000) 
ECF(t) -0.515 0.292 0.112** -0.015 
 
(2.775) (0.453) (0.052) (0.048) 
GDP(t) 0.088** 0.010 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.039) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
    
 EPCM EPCM EPCM EPCM 
RISK (t-1) -0.416*** -0.158* -5.886*** 0.686 
 
(0.158) (0.085) (1.811) (2.638) 
EPCM (t-1) 0.480** 0.209*** 0.631*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.199) (0.058) (0.220) (0.000) 
ECF(t) -5.101** -2.508** -1.022 -0.318 
 
(2.117) (1.135) (1.228) (0.812) 
GDP(t) -0.145*** -0.117*** -0.122*** 0.025 
 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.016) 
 
    
Hansen's J p-value 0.746 0.165 0.941 0.729 
Obs 748 530 534 158 
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Table 8. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
(8a): RISK measures are the impulse variables 
 Year CAR σlnTR σROA MR 
EALER 1 13% 3% 2% 1% 
 2 13% 5% 2% 1% 
 3 13% 5% 2% 1% 
EPCM 1 0% 13% 28% 9% 
 2 2% 12% 34% 10% 
 3 2% 12% 34% 10% 
(8b): EALER and EPCM are the impulse variables 
 Year CAR σlnTR σROA MR 
EALER 1 0% 0% 0.0% 0% 
 2 1% 0% 0.4% 0% 
 3 4% 0% 1% 0% 
EPCM 1 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 
 2 0% 0.3% 1% 0.3% 
 3 0% 0.4% 1% 0.4% 
Note: 1000 Monte Carlo Draws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 38 
Table 9. Main results of the panel VAR model with EALER calculated with Fourier-
flexible function (1997-2014) 
 
 
Variables 
 
1) 
CAR 
2) 
σlnTR 
3) 
σROA 
4) 
MR 
RISK (t-1) 0.387*** 0.099 0.601*** 0.382*** 
 
(0.098) (0.217) (0.160) (0.099) 
EALER (t-1) -0.216* -0.051* 0.002** 0.000 
 
(0.117) (0.029) (0.001) (0.003) 
ECF(t) -0.049 0.999 0.215*** 0.114 
 
(2.787) (0.753) (0.073) (0.098) 
GDP(t) -0.325*** 0.014 0.002 0.002 
 (0.094) (0.019) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
    
 EALER EALER EALER EALER 
RISK (t-1) 0.050 0.176 -1.066** 0.014 
 
(0.053) (0.382) (0.480) (3.900) 
EALER (t-1) 0.937*** 0.740*** 0.841*** 0.728** 
 
(0.127) (0.112) (0.096) (0.286) 
ECF(t) -0.913 -1.239 -1.263 0.155 
 
(1.262) (1.303) (1.285) (5.646) 
GDP(t) -0.160*** -0.055 -0.080** -0.075 
 
(0.046) (0.034) (0.035) (0.075) 
 
    
Hansen's J p-value 0.341 0.941 0.377 0.132 
Obs 1514 1341 1346 340 
Note: Risk is alternatively CAR (for column 1), σlnTR (for column 2), σROA (for column 3) and MR (for 
column 4). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 2. 
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Table 10. Main model with the Boone Indicator
11
 
Variables 
 
1) 
CAR 
2) 
σlnTR 
3) 
σROA 
4) 
MR 
RISK (t-1) 0.361** 0.220 -0.029 0.295** 
 (0.171) (0.222) (0.336) (0.138) 
EALER (t-1) -9.002** 0.269 0.396*** -0.009 
 (4.075) (0.645) (0.148) (0.022) 
ECF(t) -13.019*** 0.736 0.545** 0.101* 
 (5.010) (1.179) (0.218) (0.059) 
GDP(t) -0.393** -0.002 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.185) (0.021) (0.004) (0.002) 
Hansen's J p-value 0.323 0.604 0.537 0.786 
Obs 1514 1341 1346 340 
Note: Risk is alternatively CAR (for column 1), σlnTR (for column 2), σROA (for column 3) and MR 
(for column 4). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.  
 
 
  
                                                 
11
 Mean and standard deviation of the Boone indicator are respectively -0.033 and 0.095. 
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Figure 1. Impulse-responses of the banks’ risk measures to competition shock (EALER) 
 
 
Note: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions (IRF). 95% Confidence Interval (CI) generated by Monte-Carlo with 
1000 reps. 
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Figure 2. Impulse-responses of the banks’ risk measures to competition shock (EPCM) 
 
 
 
Note: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions (IRF). 95% Confidence Interval (CI) generated by Monte-Carlo with 
1000 reps. 
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